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In Garner v. Wolfinbarger,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
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of relevant evidence.2 This decision has been applauded and followed by
most federal courts.3 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has recently made clear the
wide applicability of Garner principles to all forms of shareholder litiga-
tion, derivative4 and non-derivative alike. 5
At the same time, the efficacy of such principles has been substantially
undercut by unwarranted glosses placed upon Garner by a handful of dis-
trict courts.6 Efforts by defendants to swallow up Garner principles by
labeling relevant communications "work product" have been encouraged
by broad dicta in several decisions suggesting that Garner principles are
inapplicable to such "work product."'7
This article will explore the antecedents and progeny of the Garner de-
cision. It will demonstrate the analytical errors which have threatened to
undermine the salutary purposes of the Garner doctrine, suggest the
proper framework for resolution of the Garner questions recurring in
shareholder litigation, and review legal authority which may provide ac-
cess to relevant attorney-client communications that remain unavailable
after simple application of the Garner doctrine.
I. GARNER AND ITS ANTECEDENTS
Prior to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Garner, the few cases relating to
the availability of the attorney-client privilege in shareholder litigation
had involved extreme positions and had reached opposite results. In Gra-
ham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,' a derivative action charging
the directors of Allis-Chalmers with having had prior knowledge of anti-
2 Id. at 1103-04.
3 See, e.g., Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re TransOcean
Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1978); George v. LeBlanc, 78 F.R.D. 281
(N.D. Tex. 1977); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 1977 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,894
(N.D. Tex.); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975).
1 A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder who assumes the corporate mantle to
enforce a corporate cause of action against a third party. The corporation is a necessary
party, and the relief granted is a judgment against the third party and in favor of the corpo-
ration. See Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100, 105 (1945); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (proce-
dures governing the derivative suit).
See In re International Systems & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1239 n.1
(5th Cir. 1982). A case holding that Garner applies to all shareholder litigation, with "the
nature of the suit . . . [being] of no consequence," is Evmar Oil Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.,
No. 76-4039, slip op. at 1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 1978).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 64-103.
See infra text accompanying notes 99-103. The work-product doctrine, which involves
not a recognized "privilege" but rather an immunity from discovery, precludes discovery of
documents and tangible things which were prepared "in anticipation of litigation or for
trial" by or for another party or his representative, except upon a showing that the discov-
ery party has substantial need for the discovery and is unable to obtain the substantial
.equivalent by other means. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The doctrine had its genesis in the
oft-cited case of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
8 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963).
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trust violations to which the corporation and several corporate officers
subsequently pleaded guilty, the Supreme Court of Delaware refused dis-
covery of attorney-client documents which would clearly have been rele-
vant to the defendants' knowledge of such violations.9 The court in so
doing rejected the plaintiff's position that the attorney-client privilege
should never be available to a corporation in shareholder litigation but
apparently did not consider whether the plaintiff's broad assertion could
be qualified.10
On the other hand, the absolutist position that the privilege was not
available against stockholder-plaintiffs was accepted by the lower court in
Garner itself." Moreover, prior to-the appellate decision in Garner, the
district court's ruling had been followed in three cases within the Fifth
Circuit. 2 The seminal lower court decision in Garner and its early prog-
eny polarized the issue of privilege in shareholder litigation.'"
Garner presented a simple fact situation. Stockholders of First Ameri-
can Life Insurance Company of Alabama (FAL) had brought a class ac-
tion suit alleging numerous violations of the federal securities law in con-
nection with the sale of FAL stock. Plaintiffs sought to depose one
Schweitzer, who had served as attorney for the corporation in connection
with the issuance of the stock. Some of plaintiffs' proposed questions
probed the substance of discussions at meetings attended by Schweitzer
and corporate officials, and sought information furnished to Schweitzer
by the corporation. Defendants opposed not only the questioning of the
attorney on those subjects but also objected to a subpoena seeking the
production of related documents.'4
The court in Garner placed the privilege questions "in perspective" by
noting the "fundamental principle that the public has the right to every
man's evidence, and [that] exemptions from the general duty to give tes-
9 Id. at 89, 188 A.2d at 132.
'0 Oddly enough, despite the flood of corporate litigation which has confronted the Dela-
ware courts since Graham, none has seriously addressed Garner questions. The only case
known specifically to have discussed and applied Garner is Tabas v. Bowden, No. 6619
(Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1982), in which the Court of Chancery appeared to find Garner principles
consistent with and a part of the law of Delaware. However, the court declined to apply
Garner to order the production of certain opinions of counsel respecting investment prac-
tices of the corporation in a case in which, inter alia, 1) there were no allegations of fraud or
misrepresentation; 2) the documents in question, in the court's view, related to "prospec-
tive" conduct; 3) the number of shares represented by plaintiff was unknown; and 4) the
court believed plaintiff was capable of developing her own interpretations of the legality of
the corporation's investment practices.
" 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968), vacated, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
12 Dahlke v. Morrison, 1969 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,490 (N.D. Ala.); Fischer v.
Wolfinbarger, Nos. 5911 & 5919 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 1969); Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 45
F.R.D. 510 (W.D. Ky. 1968).
13 E.g., Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders' Suits, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 309 (1969).
14 430 F.2d at 1095-96.
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timony that one is capable of giving are distinctly exceptional."' 6 It re-
viewed certain conditions described by Professor Wigmore as "prerequi-
site to the establishment of a privilege," namely that: 1) the parties
communicate with the expectation that their confidences will not be dis-
closed; 2) the element of confidentiality be essential to the full and satis-
factory maintenance of the relation between the parties; 3) the relation
be one that in the community opinion should be "sedulously fostered";
and 4) the injury that would inure to the attorney-client relationship by
disclosure of the communications be greater than the benefit of disclos-
ure."0 The court found that Garner, involving a corporate defendant act-
ing wholly or partly in the interests of others, countered by a demand by
"those others, or some of them," for access to the communications, raised
the balancing issue of Wigmore's fourth condition. 17
The Fifth Circuit rejected the absolute positions of predecessor courts
and held that in litigation charging the officers and directors of a corpora-
tion with action adverse to shareholder interests, a shareholder-plaintiff
was entitled to the opportunity to show "good cause" why the privilege
should not be invoked to conceal relevant evidence of an alleged fraud or
other corporate misconduct.'8 In so holding, the court found support in
English cases" which had treated the relationship between shareholders
and a corporation analogously to the fiduciary relationship between a
beneficiary and a trustee. Other precedent was found in Pattie Lea, Inc.
v. District Court,20 where the Supreme Court of Colorado had held that
the statutory privilege for communications between a certified public ac-
countant and his client did not bar disclosure of those communications in
a good-faith derivative suit.
The Garner court then articulated a now-famous nine-point list of fac-
tors that would bear upon whether "good cause" had been shown for dis-
covery of attorney-client communications in a particular case, citing
the number of shareholders and the percentage of stock they re-
present; the bona fides of the shareholders; the nature of the
shareholders' claim and whether it is obviously colorable; the ap-
parent necessity or desirability of the shareholders having the in-
formation and the availability of it from other sources; whether, if
the shareholders' claim is of wrongful action by the corporation, it
is of action criminal, or illegal but not criminal, or of doubtful
'6 430 F.2d at 1100 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev.
1961)).j. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527.
" 430 F.2d at 1101.
'8 Id. at 1103-04.
" Gouraud v. Edison Gower Bell Tel. Co., 57 L.T. Ch. 498, 59 L.T. 813 (1888);
W. Dennis & Sons, Ltd. v. West Norfolk Farmers' Manure & Chem. Coop. Co., 2 All E.R.
94, 112 L.J. Ch. 239, 169 L.T. 74, 59 TLR 298, 87 Sol. Jo. 211 (1943).
"o 161 Colo. 493, 423 P.2d 27 (1967) (en banc).
[Vol. 32:189
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legality; whether the communication related to past or to pro-
spective actions; whether the communication is of advice concern-
ing the litigation itself; the extent to which the communication is
identified versus the extent to which the shareholders are blindly
fishing; the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other information
in whose confidentiality the corporation has an interest for inde-
pendent reasons.2
The court's decision made it clear that the foregoing itemization was a
list of "indicia that may contribute to a decision of presence or absence of
good cause," 2 that it was not exhaustive, and that no single factor or
combination of factors was dispositive. The court also indicated the view
that its holding was "neither new nor worldshaking."23 It further stated
that the decision applied in both class action securities litigation and de-
rivative litigation, and explained in a footnote that its decision did not
turn on whether a derivative claim was "in the case or out.
'
"
2 4
The analytic foundation upon which Garner rests is that the attorney-
client privilege does not belong exclusively to the managers of a corpora-
tion, but also belongs to its shareholders. The Fifth Circuit eloquently
noted that "[c]onceptualistic phrases describing the corporation as an en-
tity separate from its stockholders are not useful tools of analysis. They
serve only to obscure the fact that management has duties which run to
the benefit ultimately of the stockholders."25 Justifying its reasoning that
the availability of the corporate privilege was subject to nullification upon
a proper showing of good cause by a shareholder, the court observed:
The attorney-client privilege still has viability for the corporate
client. The corporation is not barred from asserting it merely be-
cause those demanding the information enjoy the status of stock-
holders. But where the corporation is in suit against its stock-
holders on charges of acting inimically to stockholder interests,
protection of those interests as well as those of the corporation
and of the public require that the availability of the privilege be
subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause why it
should not be invoked in the particular instance.26
In support of that proposition, the Fifth Circuit noted that communica-
tions made by a client to his attorney during or before the commission of
a crime or fraud have never been held privileged, and pointed out that
the Garner stockholders claimed to be the victims of analogous impropri-
" 430 F.2d at 1104.
22 Id.
" Id. at n.21.
14 Id. at 1097 n.11.
2 Id. at 1101.
Id. at 1103 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).
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eties in connection with the issuance and sale of stock."7 Moreover, the
court noted that where "the same attorney acts for two or more parties
having a common interest, neither party may exercise the privilege in a
subsequent controversy with the other." 8 It likened litigation between a
corporation and its shareholders to litigation between parties that once
had had common interests.
In an amicus curiae brief, the American Bar Association contended that
the unavailability of the privileges might harm both shareholder and cor-
poration. 29 The Garner court gave that argument short shrift, specifically
noting that to "guarantee . . . a veil of secrecy" for an attorney's advice
could "encourage [a client] to disregard with impunity the advice
sought.",0
II. GARNER'S PROGENY
Although there has been some variation in application of the principles
and criteria of Garner, the rationale underlying the decision seems never
to have been rejected or questioned by any subsequent federal court.
Rather, in the numerous post-Garner cases in wide-ranging jurisdictions,
Garner's reasoning has been commended, adopted, and found dispositive,
both in derivative and class action litigation. Nonetheless, it must be ob-
served that there are significant differences between Garner's early prog-
eny and its more recent offspring.
A. Early Progeny
In the first reported post-Garner decision, Bailey v. Meister Brau,
Inc.,31 the former chief operating officer and director of the Black Com-
pany (Black) alleged that Meister Brau, the Black family, and the execu-
tors of the Black estate had conspired to breach his contract right to
purchase the company. Plaintiff sought to depose defendant Cappadocia,
a Meister Brau senior vice president. Cappadocia had been installed as
president and chairman of the board of directors of Black on May 16,
1969, less than a month before Meister Brau purchased Black. He refused
to answer questions as to his conversations between May 16 and June 6,
1969 with Meister Brau's counsel, on the grounds that he had been serv-
ing as an officer of Meister Brau at the time.3 2 Rejecting the contention
that Cappadocia had worn a "Meister Brau hat" exclusively during the
discussions, the court held that Cappadocia had been under a continuing
fiduciary obligation to plaintiff-a Black shareholder-during the period,
2" Id. at 1102.
" Id. at 1103.
" The ABA brief supported the view of an absolute privilege. Id. at 1097.
" Id. at 1102.
3, 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
32 Id. at 212.
[Vol. 32:189
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and that Black Company shareholders had a cognizable interest in his
legal communications concerning the future of their company.13 In so rul-
ing, the court relied upon Garner and Gourand v. Edison Gower Bell
Telephone Co.3 4 and noted that "[t]he important consideration" in Gar-
ner was "that management's duties gave the shareholders a sufficient in-
terest in knowing its legal communications to outweigh those interests
served by confidentiality. '3 5
While the Bailey court recognized that Garner involved a different fact
situation, one in which the communications were with counsel for the cor-
poration in which the plaintiffs were shareholders, it found Garner prin-
ciples applicable. In fact, the court concluded that the interest in disclos-
ure was even "stronger when an executive's communications have been
with counsel for a party whose interests are potentially adverse to those
of the executive's shareholders.""
Three years passed before the federal courts had another opportunity
to apply Garner. The opportunity came in Valente v. Pepsico, Inc.,3 7 a
class action proceeding brought by the minority shareholders of Wilson
Sporting Goods Company (Wilson). The suit alleged that misrepresenta-
tions had been made by defendant Pepsico, Inc. in connection with a
merger of Wilson into Pepsico and that the terms of the merger were
unfair.3 " At the time of the operative events, the general counsel of Pep-
sico had sat on Wilson's board of directors and Pepsico had possessed a
controlling interest in Wilson. Documents sought by plaintiff related to
efforts by Pepsico to determine the consequences of various forms of
merger of the two corporations.3 The court found these communications
relevant since they described information possessed by Pepsico at a time
when it was under a duty to make disclosures with respect to the tender
offer."'
The court in Valente concluded that Garner stood "generally for the
proposition that where a corporation seeks advice from legal counsel, and
the information relates to the subject of a later suit by a minority share-
holder in the corporation, the corporation is not entitled to claim the
privilege as against its own shareholders, absent some special cause.""' It
granted discovery of all the disputed documents, finding some not privi-
Id. at 214.
" See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
8 55 F.R.D. at 213-14.
'e Id. at 214.
'7 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975).
'8 Id. at 363.
Id. at 364.
40 Id. at 365.
4' 68 F.R.D. at 367. The court noted that there is a "duty to make disclosures of neces-
sary information on a subject which the minority shareholders and warrant holders were
entitled to consider prior to making their decision." Id. at 365.
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leged. With respect to the rest, the court noted that "[a] fiduciary owes
the obligation to his beneficiaries to go about his duties without obscuring
his reasons from the legitimate inquiries of the beneficiaries.""2
In reaching its decision, the Valente court determined that Garner,
though relevant, was not controlling because the minority shareholders
were not seeking information from their own corporation, but rather from
another corporate entity which was a controlling shareholder in theirs.
4 3
The court based its discovery ruling on the fact that Pepsico was not only
a fiduciary in its position as corporation, but that it also owed a fiduciary
obligation to the minority shareholders in its position as majority
shareholder.4
4
This variation on the Garner theme, centering on the fiduciary duty
owed by majority to minority shareholders, was continued in In re Trans-
Ocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation.4 5 That case involved alleged
securities law violations and breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with
a tender offer made by Vickers Energy Corporation for the minority
shares of TransOcean Oil, Inc. Applying the good-cause criteria of Gar-
ner, the court specifically rejected arguments that plaintiffs should be
held to a high standard of relevance and that they should be allowed ac-
cess only to those attorney-client documents relating directly to the
tender offer and alleged breaches of fiduciary duty.4 6 Instead, plaintiffs
prevailed on a motion to compel the production of numerous withheld
communications.
47
TransOcean is noteworthy, for although Valente was based on the fi-
duciary relationship between majority and minority shareholders, the de-
fendant in that case also was a corporation owned by the shareholder-
plaintiff. The TransOcean court based its decision solely on the majority-
minority shareholder relationship.
Broad v. Rockwell International Corp.4 8 was factually similar to Gar-
ner in that the parties were a corporation and its shareholder-benefi-
ciaries. Plaintiffs asserted securities law violations and presented no de-
rivative claims. The court described Garner as having "reasoned that the
42 Id. at 370. The court reasoned:
The attorneys whose opinions were written to Pepsico could not avoid Pepsico's
own obligations as a fiduciary. Where the fiduciary has conflicting interests of its
own, to allow the attorney-client privilege to block access to the information...
to the persons to whom the obligation is owed would allow the perpetuation of
frauds.
Id. at 369.
" Id. at 367.
44 Id. at 368.
45 78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D. 1978).
41 Id. at 697. This same argument was rejected by the court in Broad v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 1977 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,894 (N.D. Tex.).
41 Id. at 697-98.
48 1977 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,894 (N.D. Tex.).
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existence of duties running from management to shareholders alters the
traditional policy justifications for attorney-client privilege" and as hav-
ing "concluded that disclosure cannot harm the corporation to the extent
that the parties seeking disclosure are the corporation. '49 Applying Gar-
ner, the court ordered the production of documents to plaintiff debenture
holders, to whom a fiduciary duty was owed by defendants.
George v. LeBlanc5- involved an unusual application of Garner princi-
ples. The case was a derivative suit challenging efforts by LeBlanc to take
over the operations of Great Commonwealth Life Insurance Company
(GCL). Defendants sought to disqualify plaintiff's counsel on the grounds
that plaintiff had obtained from a former attorney for a holding company
of GCL certain documents containing "confidential" information.' The
court rejected the disqualification effort, noting that the so-called "confi-
dential" information upon which the motion was based was available to
plaintiffs because they "undoubtedly could have made the requisite good
cause showing" required by Garner.5 2
Despite the results in the foregoing cases, application of Garner princi-
ples cannot, of course, ensure that material sought by plaintiff will be
deemed discoverable by the court. In re Colocotronis Tanker Securities
Litigation"s involved a series of transactions in which the European
American Banking Corporation (EABC) entered into loans with the
Colocotronis group of shipping companies and then established agree-
ments whereby plaintiff banks "took participations"" in the loans. Sev-
eral years after the loans were made, the finances of the Colocotronis
group deteriorated and there ensued a series of "workout" meetings 55 at-
tended by the participant banks. The banks eventually sued EABC and
sought to discover relevant communications between EABC and its
counsel.
The Colocotronis court recognized the vitality of Garner" and reasoned
that the assertion by corporate fiduciaries of the privilege against disclos-
ure to individuals "whom they exist to serve" was "untenable. '57 How-
ever, the court concluded that based on the peculiar facts of the case, an
attorney-client relationship had never existed between plaintiffs and the
attorneys whose communications they sought. Therefore, it found that no
19 Id. at 91,304.
50 78 F.R.D. 281 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 565 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1977).
11 Defendants based their claim on the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Ca-
non 4 (1979), stating that a lawyer must preserve the confidences and secrets of a client. 78
F.R.D. at 286. The court balanced the attorney's fiduciary duty against Canon 4. Id. at 290.
2 78 F.R.D. at 290.
" 449 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
" Id. at 828.
55 Id. at 829.
5' 449 F. Supp. at 832-33.
11 Id. at 833.
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special fiduciary or trust relationship existed comparable to the share-
holder-corporate relationship58 and that the allegedly privileged commu-
nications at issue were not discoverable.
The high-water mark of the Garner doctrine was reached in 1978 and
involved a securities fraud class action proceeding. The plaintiffs in Co-
hen v. Uniroyal, Inc.59 moved for discovery of extensive information con-
cerning Uniroyal's relationship with its counsel. In particular, plaintiffs
sought legal opinions and related attorney-client communications. Con-
ceding that complete removal of the privilege as had been ordered in
Fischer v. Wolfinbarger ° could lead to a destruction of candid attorney-
client communications, the court nonetheless approved and adopted the
good-cause test of Garner." It noted that the fact that the case involved a
class of stock purchasers rather than shareholders was immaterial to a
Garner analysis, since all the purchasers had become stockholders by
purchasing stock at prices inflated as a result of alleged misrepresenta-
tions.6 2 In addition, the Cohen court aptly noted a seldom-observed hold-
ing of Garner: that where unanimity or substantial unanimity of share-
holders exists, the privilege "would be immediately overcome without
further inquiry into other elements of good cause."63 A motion for the
production of numerous attorney-client documents was consequently
granted.
B. Recent Progeny
As noted, Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc. represents the apogee of the Garner
doctrine. Subsequent cases have begun to carve out exceptions to the doc-
trine which interfere with its therapeutic goals.
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,6 4 an application of Garner principles
close on the heels of Cohen, arose out of a tender offer by Carter Hawley
Hale (CHH) for the purchase of Marshall Field & Company (Marshall
Field). Plaintiffs brought a class action against Marshall Field and its di-
rectors and officers, claiming securities law violations and breaches of fi-
duciary duty. A variety of documents were sought relating to other pro-
posed acquisitions predating the CHH proposal, documents relating to
the CHH combination, and documents relating to shareholder litigation
arising from the tender offer.
The court in Panter made clear that where a party asserts advice of
counsel as an element of its defense, as Marshall Field did, it waives the
" Id.
59 80 F.R.D. 480 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
60 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
80 F.R.D. at 484.
62 Id.
6 80 F.R.D. at 484 n.4 (citing 430 F.2d at 1101).
64 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
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attorney-client privilege with respect to all transactions where such ad-
vice was sought." The court found additional support for discovery of
documents relating to the proposed transaction, citing Garner and its
progeny and applying Garner criteria.6 In dictum, however, it found that
good cause had not been established as to eight documents because they
were prepared after the commencement of Panter, although no valid
claim of attorney-client privilege attached to those documents.67 More-
over, the court rejected claims that the work-product doctrine" justified
the withholding of fourteen other documents, since defendants' reliance
on the advice of their counsel rendered the content of the documents a
central issue which overcame any claim of work-product immunity.9
Ironically, although each document withheld in Panter was ordered
produced, the brief dictum that documents postdating the litigation or
constituting work product might be withheld proved to be a seedbed for
the practical frustration of Garner principles.
In re LTV Securities Litigation,7 0 was a securities fraud class action
brought by buyers and sellers of the securities of LTV Inc. (LTV). The
case involved allegations that the officers, directors, underwriters, and ac-
countants of LTV had conspired to defraud LTV's shareholders by over-
valuing the inventories of an LTV subsidiary through a series of complex
accounting manipulations. On November 8, 1977, prior to the conclusion
of the class period subsequently certified by the court and in the wake of
the service of subpoenas by the Securities and Exchange Commission on
LTV, the New York firm of Davis, Polk and Wardwell (Davis Polk) was
retained by LTV and its independent auditor, Ernst & Whinney. Davis
Polk thereafter represented LTV throughout the SEC investigation and
in addition "superintended an intensive examination of LTV's files and
financial procedures."'7' On July 17, 1978, LTV announced that trading
in its securities would be suspended due to possible adjustments of the
value of its subsidiary's inventories. When suit was filed by LTV's share-
holders shortly thereafter, Davis Polk's representation was expanded to
include the defense of the shareholder suits.
In LTV, the court certified a class for a period beginning in 1974 and
ending on July 17, 1978, some eight months after the retention of Davis
Polk. The discovery sought by the class was of information generated by
LTV after the SEC investigation had commenced in November 1977. As
Judge Patrick Higginbotham phrased it, the requested discovery took
place after LTV had "been under the protective wing of its able legal
" Id. at 721.
66 Id. at 723.
17 Id. at 724.
" See supra note 7.
69 80 F.R.D. at 725.
70 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
" 89 F.R.D. at 599.
1983-84]
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hens. '72 The information the class sought to obtain was, inter alia: the
identity of an SEC informant; the identity of key documents on which
LTV had based the suspension of trading of its securities; documents ex-
plicating the nature of Davis Polk's review; unexpurgated minutes of cer-
tain LTV board and annual committee meetings; and a report by LTV
counsel on the SEC investigation.7 3 LTV invoked the protection of both
the attorney-client privilege and the work-product rule in order to with-
hold the information the class requested.
After concluding that the attorney-client privilege attached to the doc-
uments at issue, the court turned to the criteria of Garner v.
Wolfinbarger. Although the LTV court recognized that pursuant to Gar-
ner the privilege "must yield where 'good cause' is shown," 4 it nonethe-
less applied Garner restrictively and denied plaintiffs' claims.
Initially, the LTV court noted that the communications ordered dis-
closed in Garner were those which formed the basis for management
judgments subsequently challenged in the shareholder action, and that
the information sought from the lawyers related to their activities before
the litigation. The court distinguished the case before it, stating that the
class in LTV sought "after-the-fact communications concerning offenses
already completed" and that LTV "management's remedial decision in
1978 to restate LTV's prior earnings" was not the act of which the class
complained.7 5
The LTV court then noted that the Garner court had indicated that
two indicia of "good cause" for the production of relevant communica-
tions were whether the communications "related to past or to prospective
action" and whether they consisted of "advice concerning the litigation
itself.17 6 Citing the decisions in Cohen, Panter, Broad, and Valente, the
court peculiarly reasoned that while disclosure of "remedial advice" could
injure the corporation, it would place the shareholder-plaintiffs in "no
worse position than if the communications had never taken place. '7 7 The
court attached great significance to the fact that none of the decisions
after Garner had subjected "post-event" attorney-client communications
to disclosure.7 8
The court also accepted LTV's claim that the requested discovery was
barred by the work-product doctrine. It found that once a federal agency
had begun investigating LTV, there existed more than a "remote" pros-
pect of litigation. Therefore, the work-product immunity attached to doc-
uments and other tangibles prepared for a party. The court did recognize
72 Id.
73 Id.
" 89 F.R.D. at 607.
75 Id.
76 430 F.2d at 1104.
11 89 F.R.D. at 608.
78 Id. at 607-08.
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that pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
party may obtain discovery of work product upon showing that he has
"substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that
he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent
of the materials by other means. '79 However, it found that the required
showing had not been made. In fact, the court demonstrated remarkable
hostility to the plaintiffs, stating that the class was merely "attempting to
capitalize on LTV's self-evaluation of its past financial practices rather
than to evaluate those practices itself."80 The court went so far as to state
that, because all the information withheld by LTV had assertedly been
produced by LTV in another form, "LTV has already furnished the
pieces of the jigsaw puzzle and the class must find the alleged solution, if
one exists, on its own."'"
Shortly after LTV, a novel application of Garner principles occurred in
a peculiar antitrust action, Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v.
Kaplan.8 2 Although the facts of Ohio-Sealy are not clear, it appears that
plaintiffs competed in the bedding market with Ohio-Sealy and its licen-
sees. Plaintiffs, however, asserted contradictory claims in the action:
1) class action antitrust claims in their capacity as competitors; and 2) a
derivative suit seeking to compel the directors of Ohio-Sealy to conform
with the antitrust laws, in their capacity as owners of 0.7% of the shares
of Ohio-Sealy. 85
The requested discovery in Ohio-Sealy appears to have involved docu-
ments relating to an assessment by Sealy's attorneys of the legality under
the antitrust laws of Sealy's system of territorial allocation. The court
reversed a determination by a federal magistrate that under Garner
plaintiffs had established "good cause" for the discovery of the docu-
ments. This decision was based on two grounds. First, the court relied on
the rationale of LTV that the information demanded long predated the
imminence of the action sub curia and was in a large measure action re-
lating to "prospective" conduct and reflecting advice concerning the liti-
gation at hand. Citing dictum in Panter, the court suggested that in prior
cases in which discovery of attorney-client communications had been or-
dered, the information related to past conduct and did not relate to the
"litigation itself. '8 4 Second, the court noted that plaintiffs represented
79 See supra note 68.
"0 89 F.R.D. at 613.
"I Id. Even in an adversarial system such as the American court system, the view that
fraud litigation may be likened to assembling a "jigsaw puzzle" would appear unduly to
denigrate the plaintiffs' purposes and to be antithetical to the salutary purposes of the se-
curities laws recognized as recently as Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, - U.S. -,
103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
82 90 F.R.D. 21 (N.D. 11. 1980).
" Id. at 25.
84 Id. at 31.
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fewer than one percent of Sealy's shares and found that the "unusual"
posture of the litigation presented an additional reason for withholding
the information. 5 It reasoned that if the documents were produced in the
derivative litigation, the information in them could be utilized by plain-
tiffs in their class action antitrust suit to the detriment of Sealy, their
competitor."6
The last published district court decision examining Garner is Donovan
v. Fitzsimmons.17 In Donovan, the Secretary of Labor brought suit
against a pension fund, claiming that various officials of the fund had
breached their fiduciary duties to fund beneficiaries by entering into a
"series of questionable investment transactions." 8 Defendants resisted
production of a variety of documents on both attorney-client and work-
product grounds.
The court adopted plaintiff's view that under Garner the officials could
not assert privilege claims against the Secretary, who was in effect acting
on behalf of plan beneficiaries, in a suit challenging the fund with breach
of its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Insurance Security
Act. 9 Specifically rejecting the claim that the Garner doctrine repre-
sented a "radical departure from settled principles,"9 the court declared:
To the contrary, the Garner approach is well-reasoned. It ade-
quately assures the public interest in attorney-client confidential-
ity, yet acknowledges that disclosure must prevail in those limited
85 Id.
81 It has been suggested that Ohio-Sealy stands for the proposition that class action
shareholder -plaintiffs stand in a different position than derivative plaintiffs with respect to
Garner. See Kirby, New Life for the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, A.B.A. J. 174,
175-77 (1983). Not only is that argument refuted by the Fifth Circuit in International Sys-
tems, but it represents a thoroughly mistaken reading of Ohio-Sealy. In Ohio-Sealy the
class action claims were brought under the antitrust laws by a competitor of Sealy, with the
result that the grant of access to the attorney-client communications for the class plaintiff
could quite reasonably have been thought antithetical to corporate interests.
87 90 F.R.D. 583 (N.D. Ill. 1981). Other courts have found Garner applicable to situa-
tions somewhat removed from conventional shareholder litigation. See, e.g., Girard Bank v.
Penn Cent. Corp., No. 81-1539 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 1983) (officers of one entity were not
permitted to hide behind work-product and attorney-client privileges in a dispute which
affected another entity to which they owed an equal fiduciary duty); Washington-Baltimore
Newspaper Guild Local 35 v. Washington Star Co., 543 F. Supp. 906 (D.D.C. 1982) (attor-
ney-client privilege not available to fiduciaries of a trust fund because the exercise of their
authority is not for themselves, but for the trust's beneficiaries); Boswell v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 164, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2713 (D.N.J. 1981) (union officers
could not assert attorney-client privilege against member with respect to advice from coun-
sel relating to legality of their conduct toward him because of fiduciary relationship); Estate
of Torian v. Smith, 263 Ark. 304, 564 S.W.2d 521 (1978) (executor of will was necessarily
acting for both itself and beneficiaries, therefore attorney-client privilege not applicable to
advice given executor by attorney).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 586.
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circumstances in which beneficiaries of corporate fiduciaries show
a valid need for information. As such, it is hardly surprising that
the Fifth Circuit's approach has received relatively wide accept-
ance in shareholder actions seeking the disclosure of privileged
corporate information. 9 '
The court then addressed defendants' assertion that Garner was inap-
plicable to work-product claims. It began by noting that the work-product
barrier to disclosure, unlike the attorney-client privilege, is the attorney's
to assert.92 The court further reasoned that shareholders as beneficiaries
do not stand in the same position vis-a-vis the attorneys as they do with
respect to their own trustees.9 3 It then concluded:
The problem is a tricky one, requiring a recognition of the pur-
poses of the work-product doctrine but tempered by the interests
in disclosure acknowledged by Garner lest the work-product im-
munity swallow up the Garner exception in its entirety. The first
step in striking a proper balance is to return to the modern foun-
dations of the privilege articulated in Hickman v. Taylor. . .and
codified in Rule 26(b)(3). The core of the privilege is to protect
against the disclosure of the private mental impressions, conclu-
sions and opinions of the attorney. Yet neither Hickman nor the
Federal Rules view the protection of these interests as absolute.
Rather, the immunity is subject to a good cause showing. That is,
a party may obtain discovery of such materials upon a showing of
"substantial need of materials in the preparation of his case and
that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substan-
tial equivalent of the materials by other means."9
Finally, the court held that the presumptive application of the Garner
exception was warranted. The work-product privilege did not bar disclos-
ure of those documents pertaining to information provided to and relied
upon by the pension fund trustees.9 The court thereby avoided many of
the analytic pitfalls into which its recent precursors had fallen.
91 Id. (citations omitted). The court found that the "pension fund trustee analogue" was
"particularly well-suited to the rule's application." Id. (citing Riggs National Bank v. Zim-
mer, 355 A.2d 709, 712 (Del. Ch. 1976), and Boswell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers
Local 164, 93 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 13,372 (D.N.J. 1981)).
" 90 F.R.D. at 587.
9' Id. at 588. The court's analysis of that point seems flawed and its pronouncement
overbroad. In point of fact, the "work product" of corporate attorneys will routinely be
shared with the corporate managers who in effect purchase it. In any instance in which
"work product" is provided to such managers, it will, in cases such as Panter, be relevant to
the question of corporate scienter and there would appear no reason why a shareholder
would have any less claim to the production of such communications than to traditional
attorney-client communications.
" 90 F.R.D. at 586 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)).
95 Id.
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An appellate court had a rare opportunity to decide a case where a
plaintiff based his claim on Garner in Weil v. Investment/Indicators Re-
search & Management." In Weil, the plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dants had violated the securities laws in offering shares of an investment
fund. The thrust of the suit was that the fund should have disclosed, in
its propectuses, that it had failed to register its shares under the Blue Sky
Laws of most states and that failure to register subjected the fund to
large contingent liabilities. The Ninth Circuit declined to certify the case
as a class action and instead directed that the case proceed through dis-
covery on an individual basis.
9 7
In the course of discovery, defendants invoked the attorney-client priv-
ilege in response to questions relating to advice given to the fund by
counsel regarding registration of fund shares pursuant to state Blue Sky
Laws. Addressing a request by plaintiff that it should follow Garner and
order production of such communications, the court tersely stated:
Without passing on the merits of Garner, we find it inapposite to
the case before us. Weil is not currently a shareholder of the
Fund, and her action is not a derivative suit. The Garner plain-
tiffs sought damages from other defendants in behalf of the cor-
poration, whereas Weil seeks to recover damages from the corpo-
ration for herself and the members of her proposed class.
Garner's holding and policy rationale simply do not apply here."
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's decision, strictly construed and limited to the
facts of Weil, appears both unexceptional and technically correct. There
was clearly little or no basis in Weil for a Garner motion, since the defen-
dant corporation was in litigation with only one former shareholder-not
with a class consisting of a substantial number of past shareholders, or
with any present shareholders. Additionally, the record suggested that no
good cause had been presented for discovery of any attorney-client com-
munications. The court had not only rejected plaintiff as a proposed class
representative but it also considered plaintiffs claims to be of dubious
merit since no contingent liability had yet been realized by the company
as a result of its alleged failure to register its securities.
The passing remarks of the Ninth Circuit concerning Garner cannot
reasonably be construed as holding that the mere fact that a plaintiff's
suit is not a derivative one should somehow be dispositive of a plaintiff's
request for discovery of attorney-client communications. There is simply
no basis for reading Weil as a departure from a long line of established
precedent or as a fundamental limitation on the applicability of the Gar-
ner doctrine. In fact, shortly after Weil, the Fifth Circuit, the procreator
647 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1981).
97 Id. at 21.
98 Id. at 23.
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of Garner, confronted the Garner doctrine for the first time in thirteen
years in In re International Systems & Controls Corp. Securities Litiga-
tion," and made it clear that such limitations were totally improper.
The facts of International Systems bear close scrutiny. In March 1976,
International Systems and Controls Corporation (ISCC) received a letter
from the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding alleged bribes to
foreign nationals. In an attempt to enroll in a voluntary disclosure pro-
gram of the SEC, ISCC appointed an audit committee consisting of two
independent directors, who retained a law firm (Watson, Ess, Marshall &
Engass) and an accounting firm (Arthur Young & Company) to investi-
gate the payments. Subsequently, derivative and class action suits were
filed against ISCC by its shareholders, who moved to compel production
of binders compiled by Arthur Young in its special review. The corpora-
tion opposed production of the binders on both attorney-client and work-
product grounds.
After reviewing its decision in Garner, the International Systems court
made clear that the rationale of Garner was not limited to derivative suits
by present shareholders. The court indicated that the Garner doctrine
was equally applicable to the class action plaintiff, since even if he were
not presently a shareholder, "at the time in question he was, and the de-
fendants owed him duties in their management of the corporation.' ' 00
Nonetheless, the court declared that Garner "was not intended to apply
to work product."'' The Fifth Circuit reasoned that "once there is suffi-
cient anticipation of litigation to trigger the work product immunity," the
mutuality of interest between shareholder and management which under-
lies the Garner doctrine is destroyed.'0 2 The court found that discovery of
the work-product materials was available under either Federal
Rule 23(b)(3) and its "undue hardship" and "substantial need" tests or
pursuant to the "crime-fraud exception"'0 3 to the work-product immunity
doctrine. It remanded the case for a detailed examination of whether the
Arthur Young documents were discoverable pursuant to those tests.
III. THE CURRENT VITALITY OF THE GARNER DOCTRINE
Current assessments of the vitality of the Garner doctrine include the
fatuous suggestion that Garner is no longer a viable doctrine'0 4 as well as
the more sober assertion that "[t]he cases construing Garner are few, and
99 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1982).
10* Id. at 1239 n.1.
"' Id. at 1239.
102 Id.
103 In general, that exception permits the discovery of otherwise privileged communica-
tions where an attorney is consulted for advice that will assist a client in carrying out a
contemplated illegal or fraudulent scheme. Id. at 1242; see In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 337
(8th Cir. 1977).
104 See Kirby, supra note 86.
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in substantial disagreement.' ' 5 Clearly, the progeny of Garner postdat-
ing Panter require serious reflection and a re-evaluation of the meaning
of Garner.1" However, one thing is clear: despite rumors to the contrary,
the Garner doctrine is alive and well.
10 7
It seems incredible that the argument could seriously be advanced by
some litigators'08 that the Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn Co. v.
United States'0 9 somehow undercuts Garner and the numerous decisions
following it. In Upjohn, an audit of one of that company's foreign subsid-
iaries found that the subsidiary had made payments to or for the benefit
of foreign government officials in order to secure government contracts."'0
The accountant conducting the audit informed general counsel for
Upjohn of the payments, and an internal investigation was initiated. One
facet of the investigation involved sending questionnaires to "all foreign
general and area managers" concerning any questionable payments made
by Upjohn.' Responses were sent directly to the general counsel. The
general counsel and outside counsel also interviewed the recipients of the
questionnaires.
The company voluntarily submitted a report to the SEC disclaiming
certain payments and also submitted a copy of the report to the IRS." 2
In conducting its investigation to determine the tax consequences of the
payments, the IRS issued a summons demanding production of all files
pertaining to Upjohn's internal investigation, including the question-
naires and memoranda or notes concerning the interviewees."' 3 Upjohn
refused to produce the documents on both attorney-client and work-prod-
uct grounds.""
The Sixth Circuit adopted the "control group" test in measuring the
05 Walton & Meagher, Attorney-Client Privilege in Stockholder Actions, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 10, 1983, at 15, col. 2.
' 0 Although the impact of the International Systems dictum is unclear, a recent unpub-
lished decision in Heist v. Jacob, No. C-3-82-184 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 1983), decided sub.
nom. In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., relied on that case to deny discovery of a
report of counsel to a committee of the board of directors of Dayco. The report related to an
investigation of alleged illegalities arising out of the company's recording of sales to what
proved to be ficticious Soviet purchasers. While recognizing that Garner stated the law of
the Sixth Circuit, the court concluded that the special report constituted work product, and
that the substantial need/undue hardship tests of International Systems prevailed over the
balancing test of Garner and had not been satisfied.
See generally Lewis, Garner Is Alive and Well In Securities Litigation, 69 A.B.A. J.
903 (1983) (cited in Heist, slip op. at 7 n.3, for the proposition that Garner correctly inter-
prets the law and should be applied in the Sixth Circuit).
108 See, e.g., Kirby, supra note 86.
'" 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
"o Id. at 386.
I' Id.
"' Id. at 387.
"1 Id.
114 Id. at 388.
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scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context and re-
manded the case to the district court."8 Under this test, the privilege
attaches to those communications made by members of the control group
comprising a company's decision-makers."'
The Supreme Court, finding contrary to the court of appeals, merely
stressed the value of certainty in the attorney-client privilege as it re-
jected the "control group" test for the privilege and precluded the Inter-
nal Revenue Service from having access to internal corporate investiga-
tive reports.1 7 The premise of the argument that Upjohn has nullified
Garner is that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege cannot be
served if the attorney and client are not able to predict in advance with
"certainty" whether particular discussions will be protected from "outsid-
ers," and that so long as Garner retains vitality there can be no certainty
that the discussions of corporate managers and corporate attorneys will
be protected from invasion by shareholders.'18
Concern for predictive certainty with respect to the attorney-client
privilege completely overlooks the fact that where past or present corpo-
rate shareholders-rightful possessors of the corporate privilege-seek to
inquire into communications between their managers and their attorneys,
600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979).
,16 Id. at 1227.
449 U.S. at 392-93. See generally Gergacz, Attorney-Client Privilege: Cases Applying
Upjohn, Waiver, Crime-Fraud Exception, and Related Issues, 38 Bus. LAW. 1653 (1983),
which describes the Court's approach as objectifying the application of the privilege by look-
ing to the presence of the following factors:
1. The communications were made by corporate employees to corporate coun-
sel upon order of superiors in order for the corporation to secure legal advice from
counsel.
2. The information needed by corporate counsel in order to formulate legal
advice was not available to upper-level management.
3. The information communicated concerned matters within the scope of the
employee's corporate duties.
4. The employees were aware that the reason for communication with counsel
was so the corporation could obtain legal advice.
5. The communications were ordered to be kept confidential and they re-
mained confidential.
6. The identity and resources of the opposing party.
Id. at 1653.
Despite this apparently mechanical approach, Gergacz emphasizes "that a very narrow
reading of Upjohn" i.e., one rigidly objectifying the privilege, "is not acceptable." Id. at
1658. This position follows directly from Upjohn, as the case states "some degree of cer-
tainty is necessary," but continues, "[w]e decline to lay down a broad rule or series of rules
to govern all conceivable future questions in this area, even were we able to do so." 449 U.S.
at 386.
"' See Kirby, supra note 86. For similar suggestions that considerations of predictive
certainty might justify retrenchment of Garner principles in favor of an expanded crime-
fraud exception to the privilege, see Dallas, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corpora-
tion in Shareholder Litigation, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 303 (1977). But see Lewis, supra note
106 (recent court decisions have strengthened rather than eroded the Garner foundations).
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the privilege is being neither infiltrated nor breached. Rather, sharehold-
ers are being permitted to monitor the conduct of their servants. The in-
terests of corporations and corporate management would seem best
served by an inability of corporate managers to predict confidently that
they will be able to cloak litigable misconduct from the eyes of their
shareholder-owners. Moreover, Upjohn itself stands for the proposition
that a corporation, for purposes of the attorney-client privilege, is not
confined to a "control group" echelon of top officers, but is to be far more
broadly defined. 19 To read Upjohn as narrowing the definition of a cor-
poration to exclude from it the corporate shareholders who constitute and
own the corporation would be both ironic and erroneous.
Upjohn surely did not break new ground in recognizing that attorney-
client privilege, properly restricted and properly applied, may have cer-
tain social benefits.1 2 0 That fact has long been recognized,' 21 as has the
fact that the privilege impedes the search for the truth and therefore
should apply "only where necessary.''1 22 In sum, neither the reasoning nor
the holding of Upjohn challenges the continued viability of the Garner
doctrine.
It is in any event highly significant that Upjohn preceded the decisions
of LTV, Donovan, and International Systems, and that an attack on the
applicability and utility of Garner does not appear to have been at-
tempted by the parties or considered by the courts in any of those cases.
Those cases did not raise the certainty interests, adverted to by the Su-
preme Court in Upjohn, to the extent that they precluded even the right-
ful owners of a privileged communication from having access to it. Fur-
ther, the court in Wolfson v. Riley,'23 when presented with similar
arguments, curtly rejected them. Although the court never issued a for-
mal opinion, it ruled from the bench that Upjohn did not undercut the
precedential authority of Garner. Indeed, the judge specifically stated:
[I]t seems to me that the Garner case is controlling, or persuasive
. . .with respect to discovery sought by shareholders in this kind
of situation and that. . .I do not read [Upjohn] as do the defen-
dants. That is a situation where the discovery was being sought
by the IRS, not a situation where discovery was being sought by
shareholders either in a shareholders' suit or in a derivative
119 449 U.S. at 392.
ISO Id. at 392-93, 398.
"I' See, e.g., United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976
(1964); see also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (stating
that the policy of the privilege is to promote the consultation of legal advisors by clients and
that disclosure of confidences ought to be prohibited by law except where the client's con-
sent has been obtained).
"' Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
" No. C79-642 (N.D. Ohio argued May 18, 1982).
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suit.'2
These brief remarks succinctly summarize the fallacies in the notion that
Upjohn has any relevance to Garner issues.
The viability of Garner is underscored by other recent developments in
the law. Communications between corporate managers and corporate at-
torneys tend to be particularly probative on issues of scienter. In Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston,'25 the Supreme Court has very recently recog-
nized that proof of scienter in securities fraud cases often requires infer-
ences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence.'2 ' The Court also held
that this very fact would make it unjust for defrauded investors to be
required to prove their case by more than a preponderance of the evi-
dence." 7 Placing unrealistic strictures upon shareholder-plaintiffs' access
to the most probative evidence available would threaten to eviscerate fed-
eral securities statutes.
Nonetheless, while the rule of Garner is alive and well, it would be
healthier if the cases between Panter and International Systems had not
placed imprecise and, in some instances, mistaken glosses on the doctrine.
It will be recalled that, subsequent to Panter, withholding of relevant
communications has been permitted on the following grounds:
1. that the requested information post-dated the filing of the suit;128
2. that the requested information post-dated the acts complained of
and constituted "post-event" or "remedial" advice; 2 9
3. that the information requested related to "prospective" actions and
concerned the litigation itself;-2 0
4. that the requested information constituted "work product"
materials."2 '
It seems clear that all the decisions limiting Garner share a common
impulse: the protection of information developed by new counsel for a
corporation not involved in the underlying transactions and retained by
the corporation after suit by shareholders had become foreseeable. In-
deed, the broad International Systems dictum that Garner did not apply
to work product was explained by the Fifth Circuit on the ground that it
was unreasonable to "indulge in the fiction that counsel, hired by man-
agement, is also constructively hired by the same party counsel it is ex-
pected to defend against."12 2 To be sure, the Panter, Ohio-Sealy, LTV,
and International Systems formulations of limitations on Garner are se-
124 Proceedings at 5, Wolfson v. Riley.
I -- U.S. __, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
126 Id. at , 103 S. Ct. at 686-88.
121 Id. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 690-92.
128 See Panter, 80 F.R.D. 718.
129 See LTV, 89 F.R.D. 595.
"So See Ohio-Sealy, 90 F.R.D. 21.
See International Systems, 693 F.2d 1235.
693 F.2d at 1239.
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riously flawed.
First, the "prospective action/past action" dichotomy of Garner has
been the subject of undue confusion, with the Ohio-Sealy court going so
far as to hold that communications involving "prospective" actions are
not discoverable under Garner."' Yet it would seem clear that Garner
intended relevant attorney-client communications with respect to pro-
spective actions to be routinely discoverable. The content of those com-
munications will usually be not merely relevant to, but among the best
evidence of, questions of corporate scienter or good faith. Indeed, it would
seem that the only relevant communications relating to prospective cor-
porate actions not discoverable under Garner would be communications
relating to those corporate activities which remain in the "sensitive plan-
ning stages.''4 Also, the Garner court's reference to "past" actions sug-
gests that attorney-client communications relating to actions already
completed might not in a given case be discoverable because they are less
likely to reflect on the scienter or good faith of corporate defendants, or
because they relate to the defense of the litigation itself. However, the
Garner court cautiously stopped far short of granting liberal exemption
from discovery to such communications, recognizing that in each case the
test for discoverability is whether there is "good cause" for production of
such communication.13
5
Second, the court in LTV clearly erred in establishing a broad excep-
tion to Garner for "post-event" communications. Of the Cohen, Panter,
Broad, and Valente cases-all of which were cited by the court"-not
one offers any reasonable support for recognition of such an extensive
exception.
To begin with, although the opinion in Cohen does not make it clear,
the record demonstrates that "post-event" communications were indeed
ordered produced in that case. In ordering the production of the re-
quested communications, the court observed that all communications re-
lated to past actions, not to matters in the "sensitive planning states.""1
3 7
The Cohen construction of the "prospective action" criterion of Garner is
totally at odds with a broad exception for "post-event"
communications."8
Additionally, the court's dictum in Panter notwithstanding, all docu-
ments at issue in that case, including "post-event" communications, were
ordered produced, since the defendants failed to establish that any privi-
lege attached to them. While there is nothing in the Broad or Valente
opinions to indicate that post-event communications were ordered pro-
90 F.R.D. at 31.
1S 80 F.R.D. at 485.
430 F.2d at 1104.
,38 89 F.R.D. at 599-600, 607-08.
117 80 F.R.D. at 485.
I' Id. at 723-26.
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duced, neither is there any pronouncement that attaches undue signifi-
cance to the date of the communications. In fact, as noted, Valente
placed the burden on defendants to establish that "good cause" had not
been shown in a particular case.
Third, the recognition in LTV of a purported exception for "remedial
advice""'u is without precedent and clearly erroneous on the facts of that
case. To the extent the "remedial" exception was meant to be coextensive
with an exception for "post-event" or "work product" communications, it
was superfluous and derived no support at all from Garner. In point of
fact, numerous documents to which the LTV court denied access as "re-
medial" fell squarely within the period of alleged wrongdoing as defined
by the class period of the suit.14 0 Since the "remedial" advice in LTV was
given during the class period, such advice would appear to have been cen-
tral to proof of defendants' good faith or scienter, and it appears difficult
to sanction denial of access to such advice on any grounds.
Under Garner's own terms, the only plausible basis for restriction of
discovery in cases such as Panter, LTV, and Ohio-Sealy is in instances
where the communications related to the litigation itself, i.e., constitute
work product."' Recognition of even this "exception" is unnecessary and
not dispositive of any Garner question, since Garner made clear that doc-
uments consisting of advice pertaining to the litigation itself were only
one indicium of "good cause."' 4 However, it would be far preferable for
the courts to self-consciously examine a narrowly-defined category of
work product, subject to an independent "good cause" test, than to recog-
nize an expansive work-product exception to Garner principles.
The dictum in International Systems that Garner is "inapplicable" to
work product is at best overbroad.'4 3 The suggestion in International
"1 89 F.R.D. at 607-08.
14' Additionally, the court admitted that the deciding factor in sustaining the privilege
was the fact that the information was available elsewhere, not that it was remedial. Id. at
608.
4 Indeed, in Wolfson, the court tentatively ruled that defendants should produce all
attorney-client communications except documents claimed to constitute work product per-
taining to the litigation itself, and that the latter should be submitted to the court for in
camera inspection. This ruling was never, however, embodied in an order, and the case was
settled before any documents were produced or any formal order was entered with respect
to the motion by which the documents were sought.
141 430 F.2d at 1104.
"1 693 F.2d at 1239; see supra note 101 and accompanying text. Of course, the fact that
one court has held that the work-product doctrine "applies to work produced in anticipation
of other litigation," is irrelevant to the discoverability of work product from other litigation
under the Garner doctrine. United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655, 660 (6th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977). Leggett & Platt was not a shareholder suit, and
the logic of Garner makes clear that work product antedating the suit at hand may be rele-
vant and discoverable and is not sacrosanct in shareholder litigation. Furthermore, the fed-
eral courts are substantially divided as to the threshold question of whether the work-prod-
uct doctrine does extend as broadly as Leggett & Platt suggests. See also authorities cited
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Systems that any and all "work product documents could somehow be
exempted from discovery under Garner seems clearly erroneous. Such er-
ror may result from the variety of work-product materials potentially at
issue and from a failure to distinguish among them.
First, there are files having nothing to do with pending or imminent
litigation which are prepared by corporate attorneys but never shared
with corporate managers and which constitute "work product" only in the
loosest sense. Second, there are similar files which are in fact dissemi-
nated to corporate managers. Third, there is true "work product" pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation by corporate attorneys who render ad-
vice with respect to, or are otherwise involved in, transactions which later
become the subject of litigation. Fourth, there is the true work product of
attorneys-"legal hens," as Judge Higginbotham would have it-specially
retained to represent corporate management in shareholder litigation
once such litigation becomes unmistakably imminent.
The rationale underlying Garner leads inevitably to the conclusion that
the test for the discovery of all relevant "work product" is whether there
is "good cause" for its production. It is logically inconsistent to deny dis-
covery of any documents denominated as "work product" which long an-
tedate the suit at hand, for such documents confirm the anticipation of
securities fraud or derivative litigation far prior to suit and presumptively
contain strong evidence of a company's scienter with respect to alleged
violations of the securities laws.
Moreover, there are good reasons for allowing discovery in many of the
categories of "work product" enumerated above. The first and second cat-
egories of work product obviously do not even qualify as "work product"
for purposes of the federal discovery rules, as they do not involve materi-
als prepared in anticipation of litigation.'" The third category involves
communications between principals to an alleged fraud or participants in
acts of mismanagement. These communications are so likely to yield
highly probative evidence concerning the mens rea of the defendants to a
suit that it is illogical to place them beyond the reach of a Garner motion.
If corporate management chooses to retain an attorney involved in al-
leged wrongdoing to defend claims based on that wrongdoing, it should be
prepared to have his "work product" disclosed to the corporation's share-
holders; otherwise, his "work product" could be used to shield facts
within his personal knowledge and to obscure his communications with
fellow wrongdoers (or, if he is a defendant, with his co-defendants) after
litigation has commenced. Such communications will ordinarily be so rel-
evant and so probative with respect to the state of mind of defendants
that it would be unfair to cloak them in secrecy.
Even the fourth category of work product should, in many instances, be
in 542 F.2d at 659-60.
144 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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discoverable. After all, it consists of nothing more than advice concerning
the litigation itself, and Garner itself makes clear that the fact that docu-
ments relate to the litigation at hand is only one indicator that good
cause might not exist. Further, Garner states that other factors, including
factors not specifically enumerated in the nine-part Garner formulation,
might prove overriding. 45
Whether or not the interests of shareholders and corporate manage-
ment diverge by the time shareholders' suits become imminent, it is clear
that it is the shareholders who pay for counsel which corporate manage-
ment hires to defend itself. Thus, any oversimplistic notion that "work
product" is nondiscoverable under Garner should be soundly rejected. At
the very least, in complex cases where proof of scienter is elusive, counsel
for shareholder-plaintiffs should be entitled to obtain work product
materials under Garner when these methods constitute a unique source of
evidence with respect to corporate scienter. Although an all-inclusive enu-
meration will not be attempted here, "good cause" for the production of
work product would clearly exist at least when key witnesses are unavail-
able or have not been produced for deposition; where there is indication
of the destruction or withholding of relevant evidence or of an abuse of
the discovery process by the defendants; or where a corporation has un-
dertaken its own "investigation" of alleged wrongdoing but has withheld
the results. As to the latter situation, there is obviously "good cause" for
streamlining the litigation process by providing plaintiffs with the results
of such investigation. If indeed the corporate "investigators" have found
wrongdoing, there is no reason for permitting evidence to be withheld
from corporate shareholders. On the other hand, if corporate managers
have been vindicated in an in-house investigation, it would appear a seri-
ous waste of corporate resources to withhold such probative evidence
from shareholders' attorneys.
If the work product "exceptions" to Garner are permitted to flourish
and the dictum of International Systems remains uncorrected, litigation
of Garner issues will frequently be tortuous and protracted. Each time a
document can reasonably be denominated a work product and each time
one postdates the main actions complained of, the salutary principles of
Garner can be temporarily or completely frustrated. At the very least, the
litigation of Garner issues will be substantially prolonged and justice will
be delayed in the interim. If a work product "exception" to Garner is to
be recognized, courts must be careful to confine it narrowly to the work
product documents relating to the litigation itself. This restriction will
serve all the policy purposes which apparently underlie the post-Panter
cases, while substantially limiting the opportunities for mischief other-
wise available to inventive defense counsel.
"' 430 F.2d at 1104.
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IV. THE DISCOVERABILITY OF WORK PRODUCT AFTER INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEMS
Even if an exception to Garner is recognized for work product docu-
ments pertaining to the litigation itself, and even if the nature of the doc-
uments in question is such that a satisfactory showing of "good cause" for
their production cannot be made, discovery of such documents will fre-
quently be appropriate.
A. Establishing and Overcoming the Work-Product Immunity
To begin with, the establishment of a proper work-product claim will
not be a simple matter. As the Seventh Circuit recently reasoned in
Banks Manufacturing Co. v. National Presto Industry,4 ' "[tihe mere
fact that litigation does eventually ensue does not, by itself, cloak materi-
als prepared by an attorney with the protection of the work product priv-
ilege; the privilege is not that broad. 1 4 7 The court explained that it
agreed with those courts holding that an investigation prepared in the
ordinary course of business, not for the purpose of aiding in future litiga-
tion, is discoverable. 148 Moreover, even where a legitimate work-product
claim is presented, plaintiffs will be entitled to establish, pursuant to
Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that they have
"substantial need" of the documents in question and that the equivalent
cannot be obtained without "undue hardship.' 149 The burden of satisfy-
ing these criteria should not be great. While the court in International
Systems stated that "the cost of one or a few depositions is not [ordina-
rily] sufficient to justify discovery of work product [materials],"' 50 it ap-
provingly cited Allen v. Denver-Chicago Trucking Co.,' 5' as a case in
which almost trivial expense was held to constitute undue hardship. 152 In
Allen, the court in fact ordered discovery of work-product materials sim-
ply because one witness was a resident of California and could be deposed
146 709 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1983).
", Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1118-19. E.g., Janicker v. George Washington Univ., 94 F.R.D. 648, 650 (D.D.C.
1982) ("The mere contingency that litigation may result is not determinative"); see Coastal
States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Diversified
Ind. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1977).
"' See supra note 67 and accompanying text. In addition, plaintiffs will be entitled to
seek access to the work product under the crime-fraud exception, pursuant to which they
must establish only a specific fraudulent intent by management in development of the
work-product materials at issue. One way to establish such intent would be to "show dis-
crepancies between what [corporate] investigators were told and the ultimate facts." Inter-
national Systems, 693 F.2d at 1243 n.13.
... 693 F.2d at 1241.
... 32 F.R.D. 616, 617 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
152 693 F.2d at 1241.
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only with "difficulty and unnecessary expense."153 In the ordinary share-
holder suit, it should be simple to establish far greater expense and
burden.15
B. Waiver Questions
Of course, there will be numerous instances where such documents,
whether categorized as subject to the attorney-client privilege or work-
product doctrine, will be available under a theory of waiver.
1. Waiver and the Special Litigation Committee
The clearest waiver situation will arise where an investigative report
that might otherwise be considered "work product" is prepared by a spe-
cial litigation committee155 and its counsel in derivative litigation, pursu-
ant to the procedures sanctioned in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado.' It has
been held that the utilization of an investigative report for the purposes
of asking a court to dismiss the litigation waives any privilege, not only as
to the report itself but also as to any documents reviewed or utilized by
the committee.'
32 F.R.D. at 618.
Nonetheless, in Heist v. Jacob, No. C-3-82-184, slip. op. at 10 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 21,
1983), the court at the outset of discovery rejected the argument that the substantial need/
undue hardship test was satisfied even though it was conceded that the requested discovery
would require numerous depositions, at a cost of about $5,000 each, to replicate. The court
noted, in so concluding, that the case before it potentially involved millions of dollars in
damages. However, the court made clear that its ruling was provisional and could be recon-
sidered during discovery in the light of new or changed facts.
'5 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981). A special litiga-
tion committee consists of "independent" directors ostensibly chartered to investigate the
merits of derivative litigation and to determine whether prosecution of such litigation is in
the corporation's "best interests." Needless to say, this curious creature of the law has been
viewed suspiciously, not only by partisan shareholder-plaintiffs' lawyers, but by such distin-
guished and impartial bodies as the American Law Institute. The Institute has sought to
place reasonable strictures on the operation of these committees and their ability to dismiss
a shareholder suit prior to discovery and trial in the adversarial setting which is at the heart
of our legal system. See Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement
and Recommendations, Tentative Draft No. 1 (April 1, 1982). It should hardly be surpris-
ing that the ALI's proposal for reform of the special litigation committee process has been
subject to vigorous attack by the litigation section of the American Bar Association, in view
of the fact that the section delegated consideration of the ALI proposal to a group consisting
almost exclusively of in-house corporate counsel and prominent defense counsel. See Sec-
tion of Litigation's Comments to the American Law Institute Project on "Principles of
Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations, Tentative
Draft No. 1" (January 28, 1983).
16 430 A.2d 779 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981).
7 See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 103
S. Ct. 1498 (1983). It appears doubtful that the attorney-client privilege could ever properly
attach to a special report after Joy, since few if any of the interviews or investigations un-
derlying such reports can, in the wake of that case, be made with any plausible expectation
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1983
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
2. Waiver by Press Release
If an investigative report is not invoked todismiss a suit but its conclu-
sions are made public by a press release or otherwise, any arguable privi-
lege could likewise be waived. As the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia aptly stated in Permian Corp. v. United States: s
The client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his op-
ponents, waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim
of confidentiality to obstruct others, or to invoke the privilege as
to communications whose confidentiality he has already compro-
mised for his own benefit.'5 9
The same principles of waiver hold true even if a special report and
related documents can be characterized as "work product."1 0 Disclosure
of a "confidential" communication to third parties waives the work-prod-
uct immunity where it substantially increases the opportunities for poten-
tial adversaries to obtain the information.'6 1
3. Waiver by Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission
Waiver of any privilege will also result from non-coerced disclosures to
the SEC. In Permian Corp., after disclosing allegedly "privileged" docu-
ments to the SEC, Occidental Petroleum Corporation sought to block dis-
semination of those materials to the Department of Energy. That attempt
was rebuffed, with the court noting, in the quotation set forth above, that
a client may not pick and choose between his opponents, waiving his priv-
ileges as to some and yet resurrecting a claim of confidentiality as to
others.
Subsequently, in In re Sealed Case,6 2 a nameless company participat-
ing in a voluntary disclosure program of the SEC engaged a law firm to
investigate questionable corporate payments. The company provided a
copy of the final report, the firm's investigative notes, and other relevant
documents to the SEC. Nonetheless, the company subsequently sought to
of confidentiality, such as is required as a predicate of the privilege. See infra text accompa-
nying note 16.
" 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1221.
M00 However, in Heist v. Jacob, No. C-3-82-184, slip op. at 5, the court declined to find a
waiver of the work-product immunity where it found that the company did not release a
significant part of the special report, or summarize evidentiary matters in the report, but
merely released the findings of the committee.
'' The law is clear that the work-product immunity is waived wherever an action sub-
stantially increases the opportunities for potential adversaries to obtain the information. 8
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2024, 209-10 (1970). It is also
waived where it is inconsistent with the client's desire to keep the documents "out of its
adversary's hands." Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
162 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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quash a grand-jury subpoena for the very same documents, invoking the
attorney-client and work-product privileges. While noting that the gov-
ernment had not made the showing that would normally be required to
overcome the work-product privilege, the court found that no work-prod-
uct claim was preserved when documents had been provided to the SEC.
The same result recently prevailed in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to
Fulbright & Jaworski and Vinson & Elkins.163 Indeed, the latter appears
to constitute the first case specifically allowing plaintiffs in private ac-
tions to receive documents shared with the SEC under its voluntary dis-
closure program. 16 4
Familiar principles prohibiting selective disclosures " should of course
be carefully applied where SEC disclosures are involved. It is unfortu-
nately not unheard-of for a company to submit the "factual" portion of
an investigative report to the SEC while withholding its "legal" analysis
on the basis of claims of work-product immunity. Sanctioning this type of
procedure can work remarkable mischief, since it may lead to bifurcated
reports with cryptic or sanitized facts at odds with the tenor of the subse-
quent legal analysis, which is never seen by the SEC. Receipt of half of a
lawyer's work product could thus mislead the SEC ,and create the very
injustice that the prohibition upon selective disclosures was designed to
abolish.
4. Disclosures to Third Parties
Waiver may also occur by disclosures to third parties. For example, in
In re John Doe Corp.,' disclosure of a "Business Ethics Review" report
to the company's auditors in connection with their year-end audit, and a
conversation between corporate general counsel and the accountant with
respect to the matters under review, were held to waive the privilege. The
court's eminently sound rationale was that the disclosure was not made to
the accountant to seek legal advice but rather to resolve audit issues and
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 99,505 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1983).
' Prior to the above-cited recent developments in the District of Columbia Circuit, some
courts had held that voluntary cooperation with the SEC did not amount to a waiver on the
grounds that such a finding might "chill" voluntary cooperation with the SEC and that such
cooperation should be encouraged. See, e.g., Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596
(8th Cir. 1978) (en banc); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust Co., 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
That approach, even prior to Permian and Sealed Case, was rejected as overbroad. In
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), for example, the court took the middle position that waiver would be found if docu-
ments were produced to the SEC without reservation, while no waiver would be found where
they were produced subject to a specific claim of privilege.
1'5 The courts have recognized that a defendant is not free to disclose only those portions
of a "privileged" communication that it finds advantageous, lest a privilege become a shield
for deception and injustice. See, e.g., R.J. Herely & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co., 87 F.R.D. 358
(N.D. Ill. 1980); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
'" 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982).
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that once a corporate decision is made to disclose confidential matter
even for a commercial purpose, the privilege is nonetheless lost.
6 7
5. Miscellaneous Waivers
Of course, waiver of the attorney-client and work-product privileges
will also occur in numerous other circumstances: for example, where ob-
jections to interrogatories seeking information ostensibly covered by those
privileges are not timely made; 68 where the materials are used to prepare
a witness for deposition and "refresh" his recollection;' 69 where the pur-
ported "confidentiality" of the materials is not even maintained within
the corporation; 70 or where privileged documents have already been
produced.'
7
'
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the normal sanctity of the attorney-client privilege and work-
product immunity, there is precious little place for their application in
bona fide securities litigation, in which fraud or waste is alleged by the
owners of a corporation and the communications of lawyers ultimately
paid for by shareholders are of utmost relevance to the state of mind and
activities of corporate managers. The Garner doctrine, which remains of
unquestionable vitality, makes clear that the only plausible limitation on
the discoverability of relevant communications is bona fide work product
prepared in anticipation of the litigation by lawyers who were not them-
selves involved in the claimed fraud or waste. As Garner noted, in all
cases the discoverability of communications is subject to an overriding
test of good cause. Further, even the "work product" exception will not
insulate from review documents for which plaintiffs have substantial need
and which they cannot obtain without undue hardship. Finally, the doc-
67 Accord United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cote,
456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
,68 See, e.g., Fonseca v. Regan, 98 F.R.D. 694, 701 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Davis v. Romney, 53
F.R.D. 247, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1971), Antico v. Honda of Camden, 85 F.R.D. 34, 35-36 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
69 See, e.g., James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); FED. R. EViD. 612.
170 See, e.g., In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867
(1973) ("[Ilt is vital to a claim of privilege that the communications between client and
attorney . . . have been maintained in confidence"); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel
Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954). But see, James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93
F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982).
'"' See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979). In cases involving accelerated discovery, findings of waiver
are less likely, since the courts are reluctant to find a waiver by inadvertent disclosure where
there is a truly substantial excuse for the disclosure. See Transamerica Computer Co. v.
International Business Mach. Corp., 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978).
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trine of waiver will preclude objections to discovery of either attorney-
client or work-product communications where use is made of them by the
corporation and where surrounding them with a mystical veil of secrecy
would be unfair and anomalous.
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